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Abstract 
Many developed countries have turned to immigration in order to mitigate the consequences of 
population aging, particularly the expected decline in the labor force population. Yet, few projection 
models take in consideration explicitly the differentials in labor force participation of population sub-
groups. This paper describes the labor force participation module of CEPAM-Mic, which is a 
microsimulation model that projects several demographic, ethnocultural and socioeconomic 
dimensions of the EU28 member countries population. Then, the microsimulation model is used to 
project EU labor force population for the period 2015-2060 under different scenarios illustrating how 
implementing sex- and country-specific dynamics of immigrants’ integration may affect the future 
labor force in terms of size, rates and gender composition. We estimated the parameters of the labor 
force module using logistic regressions based on the EU-Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). In addition to 
age, sex and education, immigrant-related variables are also included, such as immigrant status, 
place of birth, age at immigration and duration of residence in the estimation of the probability of 
being active. Our results demonstrate the importance of taking into account differentials in labor 
force participation of population sub-groups when asserting the potential of immigration as a tool for 
managing population aging. In the European context, adding immigration differentials in labor force 
participation affects mainly downward the number of female immigrants in the labor force, while 
smaller differences are observed for male immigrants. An increase in immigration levels leads 
obviously to an increase in the total labor force size, but may also widen gender inequalities in labor 
force participation and has limited impact on the total labor force participation rate. Our findings 
suggest that relying on immigration as a tool to alleviate economic issues arising from population 
aging must imperatively be accompanied by strong and efficient measures to promote a full economic 
integration of immigrants. 
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1. Introduction 
As demographic aging is transforming the working-age population of developed nations, 
understanding and forecasting labor force participation becomes increasingly relevant for policy 
makers. Indeed, as the boomers move into retirement and are replaced by smaller cohorts of young 
individuals entering the labor force, concerns grow about the increasing proportion of inactive people 
within the adult population. 
Recent research has shown, however, that the situation may not be as critical as previously thought. 
Indeed, labor force participation differs across cohorts so that many countries are now experiencing 
an increase in participation rates of older workers due to delayed retirement (Loichinger & Prskawetz 
2017; Hasselhorn & Apt 2015). In addition, participation rates for women have increased drastically in 
the past decades (Cipollone et al. 2014). Thus, the projection of economic indicators such as labor 
force participation may provide a better assessment of the consequences of population aging than 
strictly demographic measures (Sanderson & Scherbov 2015; Loichinger et al. 2017). 
Many developed countries have turned to immigration in order to mitigate the consequences of 
population aging (Termote 2011). The expectation is usually that immigration should increase the 
share of the working age population and, by extension, would positively affect economic dependency 
indicators. With declining rates of natural increase, immigration is becoming the main driver of 
demographic growth and is significantly remodeling the ethnocultural landscape in several countries 
(Coleman 2006). In this context, it becomes important to give special attention to the growing share 
of first and second-generation immigrants in the working-age population, as their market behavior 
can differ significantly from the market behavior of natives. 
This paper examines the effects of taking immigration-related variables into account when doing 
labor force projections in countries of the European Union. The first section reviews recent efforts in 
labor force projection in the European context and highlights the relevance of including immigration 
characteristics in labor force projections. The second section briefly presents CEPAM-Mic, a 
microsimulation model that projects several demographic, ethnocultural and socioeconomic 
dimensions of the EU28 member countries population and looks in more details to the labor force 
participation module of that projection model. The last section compares outputs from different 
projection scenarios to demonstrate that incomplete economic integration of immigrants affects the 
results of labor force projections in terms of size, rates and gender composition. 
This research is part of the Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration (CEPAM), a joint research 
project of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) of the European Commission. The microsimulation projection model presented in this 
paper is used to study the consequences of alternative migration scenarios on future population 
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trends in Europe, one of CEPAM’s main research objectives. Such a model is very flexible and is 
characterized by the stochastic simulation of individual life courses based on derived parameters and 
individual characteristics. Microsimulation is the preferred tool for this analysis as traditional cohort-
component projection models generally cannot be used when a large set of characteristics must be 
projected simultaneously. 
2. The importance of including immigration differentials in labor force 
participation projections 
The most common way to project the labor force is to apply predetermined participation rates by age 
and sex to standard demographic projection outputs. Many methods have also been developed to 
build assumptions concerning the future evolution of these rates, such as extrapolation models, 
targets scenarios and regression models based on macro-indicators (International Labour 
Organization 2011).  
Major recent attempts to project the size of the labor force in Europe include the Aging Report of the 
European Commission (European Commission & Economic Policy Committee 2014), projections by 
Elke Loichinger (2015) and OECD projections (Spielvogel & Meghnagi 2018). The Aging Report used 
average entry and exit rates based on recent trends and applied them to the Eurostat’s age-sex 
population projections for each country. It is based on the 2013 Eurostat population projections by 
age and sex and use a cohort simulation model to project future participation rates. It gives a 
particular attention to the increase in the labor force participation of women, which is mainly driven 
by a demographic metabolism effect of younger generations of women more attached to the labor 
market replacing older women with lower participation rates. It also considers how recent pension 
reforms implemented in many European countries can affect future participation of older workers, but 
in definitive does not consider changes in other characteristics of the population that can have an 
impact on future labor force participation rates.   
Loichinger (2015) specifically addresses what could be the impact on future labor force size of 
European countries of one of these characteristics: the increase in educational attainment that is 
likely to occur (Lutz et al. 2014). As more educated population show higher participation rates than less 
educated, controlling for the expected increase in the average education level of the future European 
population should provide a more favorable picture of the expected future. Indeed, her projections 
results comparing scenarios that included or omitted the effect of education and suggest that the 
future size of the labor force might be larger than what was previously anticipated. The model used 
by Loichinger based on the multidimensional population projections developed by Lutz and colleagues 
(2014) makes a strong case for controlling for expected future changes in the composition of a 
population when projecting the future of the labor market supply. It had the advantage of including 
an important source of heterogeneity, but it is limited by its methodology when it comes to add 
additional sources of heterogeneity.  
Multistate projection models can handle one or two additional dimensions with age and sex, but they 
are generally unable to produce more complex results, as they can only accommodate a limited 
number of dimensions. Indeed, as the size of the matrix increases exponentially with the number of 
variables included in the model, these matrices can rapidly become unmanageable as the number of 
included variables and modalities increases. Thus, their users have to rely on the assumption that 
homogeneity exists in the behaviors of population groups defined by age, sex and possibly another 
variable such as education. In the context of labor force participation of immigrants and natives, 
empirical evidences, however, suggest that such an assumption constitutes an oversimplification.  
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In a recent OECD report, Spielvogel and Meghani (2018) evaluate the contribution of migration to 
future labor dynamics of EU and other OECD countries for the period 2015-2030.  Like Loichinger, 
their results show that the labor force is less sensitive to ageing than the overall population in part 
because of the predictable increase in the labor force participation rates associated to the increasing 
education level of the population and to the reduction of the gender gap in labor force participation. 
They innovate however by taking into consideration another source of heterogeneity in labor force 
participation: the immigration status. Labor force participation of migrants differs from natives even 
when controlling for education level. They show that in the European context, immigrants from non-
European countries have lower participation rates (Spielvogel & Meghnagi 2018). In particular, 
immigrant women with low education have very low participation rates.   
They project labor force population by age, sex, education and three immigration statuses (natives, 
EU migrants and non-EU migrants) using a simple stratagem. Since there are no possible transitions 
over the life course between immigration statuses, the total labor force population is obtained by 
adding the results of three separate projections by sub-population. This approach has the main 
advantage of allowing the use of different participation rates between natives and immigrants, but it 
also has a number of limitations. First, they do not project fertility and in consequence, they can only 
project the labor force population over a horizon of 15 years. They also assume constant mortality 
rates over all the projection period and no differentials in mortality rates by education or immigration 
status, another important draw back. Also, net migration is estimated as a residual, which means that 
it includes all the measurement errors in their estimate of the migration component of their model, a 
source of error that can be relatively large when net migration is close to zero. Finally, they do not 
account for variations in labor force participation of immigrants by duration of stay in the country or 
by age at immigration.  
In most developed countries, immigrants struggle to achieve full economic integration as they 
encounter more labor market obstacles than natives (Büchel & Frick 2005; Kahn 2004; Model & Lin 
2002; Bevelander 2005; OECD 2010). Moreover, research has shown a deterioration of the economic 
integration of immigrants over the last decades, in particular for non-Whites and  immigrants born in 
third-world countries (Dustmann et al. 2003; Kogan 2006). In general, the labor market performance 
of international immigrants tends to improve with the number of years passed in the host country 
(Borjas 2008; Alba & Nee 1997), but many immigrants are now failing to catch up to natives in terms 
of economic outcomes (Beyer 2016; Picot & Sweetman 2011; Aydemir & Skuterud 2005). In some 
immigrant communities, a double disadvantage arises from being an immigrant and a woman, 
resulting in much wider gender inequalities in terms of labor force participation (Donato et al. 2014; 
Dustmann et al. 2003; Boyd 1984; Adsera & Chiswick 2007). Projections that fail to integrate 
immigration-related differentials in terms of labor market outcomes can thus likely produce biased 
results, in particular for alternative scenarios assessing the impact of different levels of immigration 
on the future size of the labor force. 
Second, international immigration to EU28 countries affects human capital stocks, which are major 
determinants of labor force participation rates. In countries where immigration flows come mainly 
from asylum seekers and family reunifications, immigrants are concentrated in low educated groups. 
Conversely, in countries with a selective labor migration system, immigrants are on average more 
educated than the natives (Eurostat 2017). In consequence, migrants are often overrepresented 
among the low and highly educated (Arslan et al. 2015). In addition, studies conducted in the USA 
and in Europe have shown that many children of immigrants from racial and linguistic minorities are 
disadvantaged in their educational trajectory (Hirschman 2001; Riphahn 2003; Marois et al. 2017). 
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These differentials need to be accounted for when measuring the effect of immigration on future 
human capital stocks, and by extension, on future labor force participation. 
Finally, immigrants and natives differ in terms of demographic behaviors, and this difference may 
have a significant impact on the composition and the age structure of the population. Depending on 
their country of origin, fertility levels of immigrants are often higher than fertility levels of natives, 
especially in the first years following their arrival (Toulemon 2004; Coleman 1994; Mayer & Riphahn 
2000; Mussino & Strozza 2012; Bélanger & Gilbert 2007). Mortality rates of immigrants are usually 
lower at their arrival and then tend to slowly converge to the rates of natives (Kennedy et al. 2006; 
Ng 2011). Increased fertility and lower mortality early after migration is thought to occur in part 
because of a tempo effect (women delay pregnancy after immigration) and because of the self-
selection of healthy individuals (only the healthiest have the strength to migrate). Different mobility 
patterns between immigrants and natives are also likely to shape the spatial distribution of the 
population as well as to impact hypotheses on international emigration, given the propensity of recent 
immigrants to realize a return migration (Dustmann & Weiss 2007).  
3. The CEPAM microsimulation model and its labor force participation 
module 
3.1 Overview of the CEPAM-Mic model 
CEPAM-Mic is a microsimulation projection model developed for the CEPAM project. Its core structure 
and base population are exhaustively described elsewhere (Bélanger & Sabourin 2017; Sabourin et al. 
2017; Marois et al. 2017). Briefly, the model aims to project the population of all EU28 member 
countries along several demographic, ethnocultural and socioeconomic dimensions. In addition to 
age, sex and education, immigration-related variables are also included in the model, such as 
immigrant status, place of birth, age at immigration and duration of residence in the host country. 
Individuals from the base population are simulated one by one and their characteristics are modified 
through scheduled events whose timing are stochastically (Monte-Carlo) determined using the values 
of their specific input parameters at any given time during the projection period. In addition to life-
course changes, the model also allows for intergenerational transfers of characteristics from mother 
to child. The parameters used as inputs are themselves derived through various statistical methods, 
using available data sources. The next section provides a detailed description of the labor force 
participation module. 
3.2 Description of the labor force participation module 
CEPAM-Mic uses an approach that is similar to the approach used by Statistics Canada in DemoSim in 
modeling labor force participation (Bélanger & Bastien 2013; Caron-Malenfant et al. 2017). In short, 
the labor force participation status (Active or Inactive) is derived for the population aged 15 to 74 
years old and is reassessed every time that a relevant characteristic of the actor is modified (such as 
age, education, duration of immigration, etc.). LFP status is assigned through a Monte-Carlo 
experiment where a random number is compared to the probability of being active of an actor given 
his/her set of characteristics. This probability is itself derived from parameters estimated from a 
logistic regression performed. Future evolution of labor force participation rates depends also on 
country-specific entry and exit rates by cohort, sex and education. Global participation rates in the 
model further vary through compositional effects, whereas groups with higher or lower participation 
rates may increase their relative importance in the population. 
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The European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is the only data source providing comprehensive and 
standardized questions on labor force participation for all EU28 countries as well as on education, 
age, sex, and some immigration-related variables. EU-LFS data from 2010 to 2015 were pooled to 
minimize conjectural factors and to provide a large enough sample to derive robust parameters for all 
countries and both sexes. Sex- and country-specific logit regressions were then performed on a 
binomial variable giving LFP status as defined by the International Labor Organization (ILOSTAT)1. 
Equation 1 below provides a mathematical description of the regression model:  
logitሺܲሻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܩܧ ൅ ߚଶܧܦܷ ൅ ߚଷܻܧܣܴ ൅ ߚସሺܣܩܧ ∗ ܧܦܷሻ ൅ 
ߚହሺܣܩܧ ∗ ܻܧܣܴሻ ൅ ߚ଺ሺܧܦܷ ∗ ܻܧܣܴሻ ൅ ߚ଻ሺܣܩܧ ∗ ܧܦܷ ∗ ܻܧܣܴሻ ൅  
ߚ଼ܫܯܯܫܩ ൅ ߚଽሺܫܯ15 ∗ ܧܦܷሻ        (Eq.1) 
  
Where 
 β0 + β1+ β2+ β4 capture the joint effect of age and education on labor force participation 
rates2. Education is divided into 3 categories: 
1. Low (L): Completed lower secondary education or less (ISCED 0, 1 ,and 2); 
2. Medium (M): Completed upper secondary (ISCED 3); 
3. High (H): Postsecondary education (ISCED 97: 4, 5A, 5B and 6; ISCED 2011: 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8); 
 β3+ β5+ β6+ β7 capture the age and education specific trends in labor force participation; 
 β8 is a set of parameters for an immigration variable (IMMIG) combining place of birth3, age 
at arrival and duration of stay. The variable is divided in five categories: 
1. Born in EU28; 
2. Generation 1.54 born outside EU28; 
3. Generation 15 born outside EU28, duration of stay <5; 
4. Generation 1 born outside EU28, 5<=duration of stay <10; 
5. Generation 1 born outside EU28, 10<=duration of stay;  
 β9 is a set of parameters estimating the labor force returns on education for migrants born 
outside the European Union and who arrived at the age of 15 or above (IM15). 
A model including parameters β0 to β7 would provide gross participation rates by age, sex, and 
education. Implementing β8 and β9 further provides participation rates that are net from immigration-
related characteristics.  
It should be noted that immigration variables do not distinguish natives from intra-European 
migrants. A person born in Germany and living in France, for instance, would have the same 
parameters as a French native. This assumption, although not ideal, aims at minimizing 
                                               
 
1 Individuals in compulsory military service are considered part of the active population. 
2 The LFS does not provide information on labor force participation rates in the UK for the age group 70‐74. It 
was therefore assumed to be half of the value observed for the age group 65‐69 for each education level. 
3 For Germany, the question on the country of birth is not asked in the LFS. We use the nationality as a proxy 
to distinguish EU28 migrants from international immigrants. 
4 Generation 1.5: immigrants admitted before the age of 15 
5 Generation 1 : immigrants admitted at the age of 15 and above 
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inconsistencies arising from the fact that intra-European mobility in the projection model does not 
account for LFP status. 
3.3 Analysis of regression results 
Figure 1 below shows the average derived probability of being active obtained from the parameters 
β0 + β1+ β2+ β4 for all EU28 countries, by age, sex, and education for EU-born individuals (the 
reference category for the variable IMMIG) in 2015 (the reference category of the variable YEAR).  
Expectedly, Figure 1 shows that people with higher education levels are much more likely to be active 
than people with the lowest level of education. This holds true for most age groups and for both 
sexes, but the education differential is stronger for women. After the age of 60, the gap in the 
probability of being active between education levels increases: people with high education are more 
likely to be active than others, and they are active for a longer time. The education gradient is also 
steeper for women: for middle age adults, the difference in the probability of being active between 
low and high education is in general less than 15 percentage points for men, while it sometimes 
exceeds 25 percentage points for women. Similar differences by education level were also found by 
Loichinger (2015) and by Spielvogel and Meghnagi (2018). Overall, these results stress the 
importance of integrating the education dimension in projections of labor force participation, 
especially for countries experiencing population aging and variations across cohorts in terms of 
human capital. 
Table 1 below shows the average value of β8 (the parameter for the immigration variable, see 
equation 1) for all EU countries, while Figure 2 shows the sex- and country-specific values of this 
parameter. Note that thanks to the relatively large sample size, almost all sex- and country-specific 
parameters are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Turning to Table 1, we see that the results go 
in the expected direction. For men, labor force participation for immigrants born outside the EU is 
much lower than for EU-born individuals (β8=-0.936 for recent immigrants), although it improves with 
the number of years spent in the host country. After 10 years, the labor force participation rates of 
immigrants are close to the rates of EU-born individuals (β8= -0.223), and this holds true in many 
high immigration countries (β8=0.063 for Spain, -0.185 for France, -0.040 for Italy and -0.256 for UK; 
see Figure 2). However, an important gap remains for immigrants established for a decade or more in 
some countries, such as Germany (β8=-0.752), Belgium (β8=-0.917) and the Netherland (β8=-1.183). 
In Denmark, where immigration inflows are dominated by refugees and family reunification (Liebig 
2007), the situation even appears to deteriorate with time. Indeed, β8 drops from -1.078 for recent 
immigrants to -1.692 for immigrants admitted more than ten years ago. Conversely, among males, 
labor force participation rates in Greece and in Luxemburg are higher for immigrants than for natives 
and are higher for more recent immigrants than for established immigrants. Spain emerges as a 
special case, no clear differences appear between male immigrants and natives. In any case, it should 
be kept in mind that only formal immigration is considered, as illegal immigrants are not explicitly 
surveyed in the EU-LFS. 
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Figure 1: Probability of being active6 for EU-born individuals by age, sex, and highest 
level of educational attainment, EU28, 2015 
Source: Pooled data of LFS 2010-2015, authors’ calculation 
 
  
                                               
 
6  Converted from the average of country specific parameters. 
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Table 1: Average value of β8 (IMMIG, see equation 1), EU28, 2010-2015 
 Women Men 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Born in EU28 Ref Ref Ref Ref 
Generation 1.5 born outside EU28; -0.220 0.322 -0.180 0.265 
Generation 1 born outside EU28, duration 
of stay <5; -1.642 0.566 -0.936 0.850 
Generation 1 born outside EU28, 
5<=duration of stay <10; -1.258 0.433 -0.520 0.732 
Generation 1 born outside EU28, 
10<=duration of stay; -0.755 0.371 -0.223 0.691 
Participation rates of immigrant women follow similar patterns as for immigrant men, although the 
gap compared to natives is wider. For recent immigrants born outside the European Union, the 
average value of β8 for women is more than fifty percent lower than it is for men (β8=-1.642, see 
Table 1). Even after 10 years, their participation rates are far below the rates of natives (β8=-0.755). 
In fact, labor force participation rates of immigrant women do not reach the level of natives in any of 
the high immigration countries. Gender inequity in terms of labor force participation appears to be an 
issue affecting immigrant women more strongly than natives, which supports the double 
disadvantage theory (Boyd 1984; Ballarino & Panichella 2017). These results are also consistent with 
evidences gathered in the U.S.by Antecol (2000) and in Europe by Pessin & Arpino (2018) concerning 
the role of cultural background in labor force integration: for some source regions, persistent gender 
gaps resist explanation based on socio-economic or institutional factors alone.  
Immigrants who established themselves before the age of 15 (generation 1.5) have participation 
rates that are closer to natives for both sexes, although still a bit lower (β8=-0.220 for women and 
β8=-0.180 for men, see Table 1). This shows some evidence of integration, as their labor force 
participation rates are much closer to the rates of natives than to the rates of immigrants arrived at 
an older age. In some countries, however, immigrants from generation 1.5 encounter larger 
difficulties in the labor force, such as in the Netherland (β8=-0.469 for women and β8=-0.496 for 
men), in the UK (β8=-0.506 for women and β8=-0.434 for men) and in Belgium (β8=-0.568 for 
women and β8=-0.466 for men). Interestingly, no notable gender gaps remain for generation 1.5 
immigrants.  
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Figure 2: Value of β8  (IMMIG, ref=Born in EU28; see equation 1), by sex and country of 
residence, 2010-2015 
 
Participation rates of immigrant women follow similar patterns as for immigrant men, although the 
gap compared to natives is wider. For recent immigrants born outside the European Union, the 
average value of β8 for women is more than fifty percent lower than it is for men (β8=-1.642, see 
Table 1). Even after 10 years, their participation rates are far below the rates of natives (β8=-0.755). 
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the role of cultural background in labor force integration: for some source regions, persistent gender 
gaps resist explanation based on socio-economic or institutional factors alone.  
Immigrants who established themselves before the age of 15 (generation 1.5) have participation 
rates that are closer to natives for both sexes, although still a bit lower (β8=-0.220 for women and 
β8=-0.180 for men, see Table 1). This shows some evidence of integration, as their labor force 
participation rates are much closer to the rates of natives than to the rates of immigrants arrived at 
an older age. In some countries, however, immigrants from generation 1.5 encounter larger 
difficulties in the labor force, such as in the Netherland (β8=-0.469 for women and β8=-0.496 for 
men), in the UK (β8=-0.506 for women and β8=-0.434 for men) and in Belgium (β8=-0.568 for 
women and β8=-0.466 for men). Interestingly, no notable gender gaps remain for generation 1.5 
immigrants.  
Table 2 shows the average values of parameters for education alone (β2) and for the interaction of 
education with a dichotomous variable for generation 1 migrants born outside the EU (β9). 
Unsurprisingly, as was already highlighted in Figure 1, education is a major driver of labor force 
participation and has similar effects for both males and females (see Table 2). However, the effect of 
education is smaller for immigrants, especially for women. The positive effect on participation rate of 
having a high education level is about 50% lower for immigrant women when compared to native 
women. The impact of education on labor force participation is also reduced for male immigrants but 
less (by about a quarter, see Table 2). These lower returns on education could be partly explained by 
lower quality degrees in source countries, as well as by cultural differences in the definition of gender 
roles (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Antecol 2000). Note that although this pattern is observed in most 
countries, some exceptions still remain. The most notable one is the case of females in the UK, where 
the parameter for β9 is not statistically significant, suggesting that in this country, the return on 
education for natives and immigrants is similar, at least in terms of labor force participation. 
Table 2: Average value of parameters for education and its interaction with immigration 
 Women Men 
Level EDU (β2) EDU*IM15 (β9) EDU (β2) EDU*IM15 (β9) 
Low -1.753 0.817 -2.005 0.590 
Medium -0.753 0.467 -0.751 0.153 
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3.4 Future labor force participation scenarios7 
Equation 1 presented above provides estimates for the 2010-2015 period. For projection purposes, 
explicit assumptions on future trends in labor force participation are necessary. Assuming constant 
rates would mean stopping abruptly the current trend in increasing labor force participation of women 
and of older workers. Cohort developments can be used to project participation rates by calculating 
entry and exit rates (Carone 2005; Loichinger 2015; Productivity Commission 2005). Increases in 
participation rates between time t-5 and t between age-group (x,x+4) and (x+5,x+9) mean that 
cohort participation increases, and entry rates are calculated using the following equation: 
E୧୨ ntryrate୶,୶ାସ୲ ൌ ୔౟
ౠ ୖ౮శఱ,౮శవ౪ 	ି	 ୔౟ౠ ୖ౮,౮శర౪షఱ
୔ୖౣ౗౮	ି	 ୔౟ౠ ୖ౮,౮శర౪షఱ
			       (Eq.2) 
where ܲ௜௝ ܴ௫,௫ାସ is the education- (j) and sex-specific (i) participation rate of age groups8 x to x+4. 
The maximum potential participation rate ܴܲ௠௔௫ is set to 0.99. Similarly, decreases in participation 
between time t-5 and t between age-group (x,x+4) and (x+5,x+9) signify that cohort participation 
decreased, and exit rates are calculated using 
E୧୨ xitrate୶,୶ାସ୲ ൌ 		 ୔౟
ౠ ୖ౮,౮శర౪షఱ 	ି	 ୔౟ౠ ୖ౮శఱ,౮శవ౪
୔౟ౠ ୖ౮,౮శర౪షఱ
			       (Eq.3) 
Entry and exit rates by age, sex and education level are calculated for each country, based on 
participation rates of the years 2010 and 2015 (calculated with β0 to β7 from equation 1). In order to 
obtain future participation rates, the following equations were used. In case of an observed increase 
in cohort-participation, education-, sex-, and age-specific labor force participation from 2020 to 2060 
are calculated using 
PR୧୨ ୶ାହ,୶ାଽ୲ାହ ൌ 	 E୧୨ ntryrate୶,୶ାସ୲ 	∗ 	 ൫PR୫ୟ୶ 	െ	 P୧୨ R୶,୶ାସ୲ ൯ 	൅	 P୧୨ R୶,୶ାସ୲    (Eq.4) 
Analogously, in those instances where participation decreased between 2010 and 2015, education-, 
sex-, and age-specific labor force participation at time t+5 is calculated using 
PR୧୨ ୶ାହ,୶ାଽ୲ାହ ൌ ൫1	 െ	 E୧୨ xitrate୶,୶ାସ୲ ൯ 	∗ 	 P୧୨ R୶,୶ାସ୲ 		     (Eq.5) 
Entry and exit rates are kept constant between 2020 and 2060, and the participation rate of 2015 is 
used for the age group 15-19. Participation rates that would be projected to decrease after 2015 are 
kept at their 2015 values to avoid unrealistically low rates in the future. 
In order to assess the effect of immigration on the projected labor force, four scenarios are built. 
                                               
 
7 The authors would like to acknowledge Elke Loichinger for her help in the estimation method of future labor 
force participation. 
8 The participation rate for the age group 15‐19 has no differential for education. 
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1- EDU 
In this scenario, only labor force participation by age, sex, and education levels are taken into 
account. A logit regression including β0 to β7 is first performed and the cohort development 
method is then applied in order to determine future labor force participation rates. Hence, the 
projection will not account for immigration-related variables in determining the future labor force. 
2- EDU_IMM 
In this scenario, immigration-related parameters are added to the model (corresponding to 
parameters β8 and β9).  Entry and exit rates calculated from β0 to β7 are adjusted in consequence 
to get future rates by age, sex, and education, net from immigration variables. In other words, 
we used the complete regression model presented in equation 1 and we used the cohort 
development method to make evolve the cohort-education labor force participation rates. 
3- EDU+ 
This scenario uses the same parameters as the EDU scenario for the labor force participation, but 
the inflow of international immigrants (born outside the European Union) is doubled. 
4- EDU_IMM+ 
This scenario uses the same parameters as the EDU_IMM scenario for the labor force 
participation, but the inflow of international immigrants (born outside the European Union) is 
doubled. It is assumed that an increase in immigration will not affect labor force participation, an 
hypothesis consistent with the scientific consensus on the marginal economic impact of 
immigration (Longhi et al. 2008). 
Comparison of the EDU and EDU_IMM scenarios will show the impact of immigration-related 
differentials in labor force participation in scenario situation where the size and composition of future 
cohorts of immigrants remain stable. Comparison of the EDU+ and EDU_IMM+ scenarios will further 
show the extent to which projected labor force participation is sensitive to immigration levels, as 
immigration-related differentials are taken into account. 
The main objective of this paper is to propose a new method in projecting the impact of immigration-
related variables on labor force participation. Accordingly, projection assumptions for other 
components are the same in all four scenarios. The base population is itself built from the 2014-2015 
EU-LFS, all rounds of the ESS and Eurostat census data, and includes immigration-related variables 
such as place of birth (Sabourin et al. 2017). Fertility rates are estimated from logit regressions taking 
into account, age, education, region of birth, age at immigration, duration of stay, and country of 
residence and calibrated on future trends estimated in Lutz et al. (2018). Mortality rates by age, sex 
and educational attainment are taken from Lutz et al. (2018). Assumptions on future educational 
attainment also take social capital and ethno-cultural characteristics into account (see Marois et al. 
2017 for more details).  
To get out-migration rates by sex and country of residence, the average number of out-migrants from 
2014 to 2016 (Eurostat table: migr_emi2) was divided by the average population aged 20-34 during 
the same period. Age-specific out-migration rates are then derived within the microsimulation model 
as follows. First, the Eurostat derided out-migration rates are applied to the 20-34 population to get 
the expected number of out-migrants on a given year. The number of out-migrants are then 
distributed according to age using a Rogers-Castro schedule. Finally, age-specific out-migration rates 
are obtained by taking the ratio of out-migrants to the population, by age, sex and country of 
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residence. Out-migration rates in the simulation are recalculated every five years. During the 
simulation, out-migrants may either move within the EU, and are assigned a new country of 
residence, or they can leave the EU, in which case their simulation is terminated. The proportion of 
out-migrants leaving the EU are derived from Eurostat tables on emigration according to region of 
destination (table: migr_emi3nxt). Origin-destination matrix for intra-European mobility were derived 
using an update for the period 2009-2016 of Raymer et al.’s (2013) Bayesian estimates of European 
migration9. 
In scenarios EDU and EDU_IMM, the number of international immigrants is assumed to remain 
constant to average observed during the period 2013-2016 (Eurostat 2018)10. Scenarios EDU+ and 
EDU_IMM+ double this number. Furthermore, future cohorts of immigrants have the same 
characteristics in terms of age, sex education, region of birth, etc. as recent immigrants, which have 
been estimated from the EU-LFS, the EU-ESS and Eurostat census data. Table 3 presents the number 
of immigrants assumed in the high and constant immigration scenarios of these projections. These 
schematic scenarios remain plausible even if EDU+ and EDU_IMM+ doubled the number of 
immigrants from non-EU countries, since even the high immigration scenarios assume lower 
immigration rates than what has been observed for several decades in some other developed 
countries such as Canada and Australia. 
Table 3: Assumptions on the number of international immigrants (born outside EU28) (5 
years inflow) 
Host country Scenarios EDU and EDU_IMM 
Scenarios EDU+ and 
EDU_IMM+ 
AT 223,597 447,193 
BE 263,245 526,490 
BG 84,909 169,818 
CY 31,609 63,218 
CZ 96,489 192,978 
DE 1,991,155 3,982,310 
DK 188,434 376,868 
EE 16,409 32,818 
ES 1,100,676 2,201,353 
FI 85,108 170,215 
FR 1,101,813 2,203,625 
GR 99,462 198,923 
HR 37,968 75,935 
                                               
 
9  The authors would like to acknowledge Erofili Grapsa for the update of Bayesian estimates of migration 
flows. 
10 In order to remove from the average the abnormal high immigration inflows resulting from the refugee 
crisis, we excluded flows of 2015 for Austria and Germany, and the flow of 2016 for Greece. 
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Host country Scenarios EDU and EDU_IMM 
Scenarios EDU+ and 
EDU_IMM+ 
HU 114,329 228,658 
IE 174,873 349,745 
IT 1,057,411 2,114,823 
LT 37,193 74,385 
LU 9,348 18,695 
LV 20,310 40,620 
MT 34,791 69,583 
NL 397,853 795,705 
PL 466,226 932,453 
PT 55,871 111,743 
RO 147,265 294,530 
SE 469,441 938,883 
SI 51,148 102,295 
SK 6,348 12,695 
UK 1,630,214 3,260,428 
EU28 9,993,490 19,986,979 
 
4. Results 
Figure 3 illustrates the projected European labor force for the period 2015- 2060 and Figure 4 shows 
labor force dependency ratios (LFDR) for the population aged 15 and over for the same period. The 
LFDR corresponds to the population aged 15 and over out of the labor force divided by the population 
in the labor force. A ratio of 1 indicates that there is one inactive for each active person in the adult 
population. 
At the EU level, results for EDU (excluding the effect of immigration variables) and EDU_IMM 
(including the effect of immigration variables) turn out to be approximately the same, with labor force 
size and participation rates only slightly higher in the EDU scenario. In both scenarios, the size of the 
labor force decreases. The decline is of about 23.5 million individuals in the scenario EDU (from 244.8 
million in 2015 to 221.3 million in 2060) and of 26.3 million for EDU_IMM (218.5 million in 2060). The 
labor force size in the EDU scenario is larger than in EDU_IMM by 2.8 million, but this represents only 
1.3% of the total. The mean percent difference between the projected labor force size of the two 
scenarios in 2060 for the 28 countries is 1.2%, although it is a bit higher for high immigration 
countries such as Germany (3.1%).  Similar trends are also observed in the projected labor force 
dependency ratios of the two scenarios. Initially at 0.75 in 2015 the LFDR would go up to 1.00 under 
the EDU scenario and to 1.02 under the EDU_IMM scenario in 2060. These results support the 
hypothesis that labor force projections that are omitting immigration variables would slightly 
overestimate the total labor force size and LFDR. The impact can be considered marginal overall, 
although it can be more important for high immigration countries. 
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Given differences in labor force participation by immigrant status, the modest impact of immigration-
related variables on the projection results may appear surprising at first, several factors can explain 
it. First, in the reference scenario immigration levels are relatively low. In the EU as a whole, as 
mentioned before, international immigration levels are well below what they are in other immigration 
countries. Second, the negative impact of being an immigrant is strongest during the first decade 
after arrival in the host country, and the pool of recent immigrants does not grow significantly during 
the projection. Finally, results at the EU level mask important variations across member states: 
international immigration is mostly concentrated in a handful of countries. 
Figure 3: Projected labor force size according to 4 scenarios, EU28, 2015-2060 
When assuming higher immigration levels, the impact of immigration-related parameters becomes 
more apparent. Although both high immigration scenarios reverse the decline of the active 
population, EDU_IMM+ generates about 6.4 million fewer active individuals than EDU+ at the horizon 
of the projection, a difference of about 2.3% (Figure 3). In high immigration countries such as 
Germany, or in countries where the economic integration of immigrants is problematic, such as in 
Denmark the difference between the two scenarios can be more important with 5.2% differences in 
Germany and 7.8% in Denmark. 
Increasing immigration levels has a direct impact on the size of the labor force, Figure 3 shows that 
doubling international immigration could prevent a labor force decline. Increasing immigration levels, 
however, has a much smaller effect on labor force dependency ratios, an indicator more related to 
the age structure of the population. Indeed, compared to EDU, EDU+ improves the LFDR projected 
for 2060, but increasing migration does not reverse the strong expected increase in the LFDR. This is 
in line with demographic literature showing that immigration can only have a marginal and temporary 
effect on the age structure of the host region, and, as a consequence, can only have a small impact 
on participation rates (Bijak et al. 2008; Marois 2008; Coleman 1992; Coleman 2008). 
  
16 
 
Figure 4: Labor force dependency ratio according to 4 scenarios, EU28, 2015-2060  
In addition, the gain in the LFDR arising from doubling immigration levels is reduced when 
introducing immigration-related parameters in the projection. While the difference between EDU to 
EDU+ is of 0.10 point in 2060, this difference drops to 0.08 point when comparing EDU_IMM to 
EDU_IMM+. Increasing immigration levels increases the size of the active population, but it also 
increases the inactive population at a similar pace because labor force participation rates of 
immigrants are lower, especially for women.    
For the EU28 as a whole, about 18% of the reduction in the LFDR from doubling immigration is 
canceled by factoring in immigration parameters in the projection model. However, this impact varies 
rather strongly across countries (Figure 5). The impact of doubling international immigration is 
significantly reduced in most Western European countries. This percentage exceeds 30% in France 
(32%), Germany (37%), Belgium (42%), Denmark (52%), and Netherland (53%) revealing that in 
these countries, the younger age structure of new immigrants barely compensate for much lower 
labor force participation rates. In contrast, when differentials between immigrants and natives in 
labor force activity are factored in, projected labor force dependency ratios improve in Spain (-5%), 
Italy (-8%) and Greece (-10%), because in these countries international migrants show higher labor 
force participation rates than natives.  
Figure 6 further disaggregates the projections of labor force participation rate by immigrant status 
(either born inside or outside the European Union) for the two high-immigration scenarios (EDU+ and 
EDU_IMM+)11. Omitting immigration-related differentials (EDU+, blue lines), immigrant participation 
rate exceeds the corresponding rate for natives by 12 to 19 percentage points. Both immigrants and 
natives see a decline in participation rates due to aging and to the retirement of older cohorts. The 
higher participation rate of immigrants is mainly the result of a younger age structure associated with 
                                               
 
11 The reference scenario would give similar results.  
17 
 
the sustained and substantial inflows of new cohorts of young migrants. This advantage could even 
be higher if the educational attainment of migrants was not inferior to the educational attainment of 
natives. However, when differentials in participation rates of immigrants and natives are taken is not 
account, the advantage provided by this younger age structure is reduced by about 30%. From 
around 12 to 19 percentage points in EDU+ (compare blue lines), the advantage of immigrants 
decreases to 5 to 13 points in EDU_IMM+ (compare red lines). In other words, a projection that does 
not take into account for immigrant lower labor force participation would over-estimate the labor 
force participation rate of immigrants by 5 to 8 percent points (compare dashed lines). 
Figure 5: Proportion of the reduction in LFDR from doubling immigration canceled by 
implementing immigration differentials in labor force participation, 2060 
As we saw earlier for the immigration parameter (β8, see equation 1 above), differences between 
immigrants and natives are more important for females than they are for males. Thus, adding 
immigration differentials to the projection model does not only affect the size of the labor force, but 
also its composition in terms of immigration status and sex.  
We assess the impact of adding the immigration parameters on the sex composition of the immigrant 
labor force by computing the ratio of the active population projected under the scenarios EDU+ and 
EDU_IMM+. This is illustrated on Figure 7, for both sexes and all countries12. For the EU as a whole, 
the EDU+/EDU_IMM+ ratio for male immigrants is equal to 1.03, meaning that the projected number 
is overestimated by only 3% when immigration differentials in labor force participation is not 
accounted for. The ratios for male immigrants are close to one in most Western Europe countries, 
                                               
 
12 Again, results for EDU_IMM/EDU are similar to EDU_IMM+/EDU+ and are not presented. 
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with the exception of Denmark (1.19) and the Netherland (1.15) where differences in labor force 
participation are the largest.  
Figure 6: Projected labor force participation rates (age 15+) for immigrants and natives, 
EU28, 2015-2060 
 
For females for the EU as a whole, the ratio reaches 1.15, meaning that a projection that does not 
account for differentials in labor force participation would overestimate the number of active female 
immigrants by about 15%. In absolute size, this represents an overestimation of about 6.3 million 
individuals for EDU+ and 3.3 million individuals for EDU. The impact of immigration differentials on 
the number of active female immigrants is observable in most countries, and is particularly strong in 
Netherland (1.32), Belgium (1.31), Germany (1.30), and Denmark (1.26). In Western Europe, only 
Spain, Italy, Greece, and Portugal do not follow this trend. 
In order to estimate the global impact of immigration parameters on the projected labor force,  
Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions are performed on the 2060 active population, broken down by age (15-
74), sex, and country (Mincer & Zarnowitz 1969). This procedure can be used to compare two sets of 
data describing the same variable, such as observed and projected values of population counts.  In 
this case, EDU_IMM and EDU (or EDU_IMM+ and EDU+) are compared, such that: 
"ܧܦܷ"ሺ݋ݎ	"ܧܦܷ ൅ "ሻ ൌ∝ ൅ߚ ∗ "ܧܦܷ_ܫܯܯ"ሺ݋ݎ	"ܧܦܷ_ܫܯܯ ൅ "ሻ     (Eq.6) 
A parameter β that is statistically different from 1 thus indicates a systematic relative difference 
between the two scenarios, affecting all countries and all age groups. Table 3 shows the parameter β 
for different sub-populations. Note that a value of α different from zero would indicate a systematic 
difference in absolute value between the two scenarios, which would be unexpected (different rates 
are not expected to yield absolute biases). Indeed, α is not statistically different from zero in any of 
our comparisons. 
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Figure 7: Ratio of the projected number of active immigrants between scenario EDU+ 
and scenario EDU_IMM+ in 2060, by sex and country  
 
 
When comparing EDU to EDU_IMM, the value of β for the total active population (1.014) indicates a 
relatively strong concordance between the two scenarios (a difference of only about 1.4%). Looking 
at sub-groups, however, reveals more substantial discrepancies. At 1.071, the parameter for the 
immigrant active population is much larger than one, indicating an average overestimate of 7.1% for 
EDU compared to EDU_IMM. This systematic overestimation of the immigrant active population is 
mostly due to female immigrants, for which the active population in EDU exceeds EDU_IMM by 
13.5% (β=1.135). The parameters for male immigrants are also statistically significant, but much 
lower. These patterns hold in the high immigration scenarios (EDU_IMM+ and EDU+).  
The above analysis has shown that adding immigration differentials in labor force population 
projections has a significant negative impact on the number of active female immigrants, while 
having a modest effect for active male immigrants. This shows that projections yielding similar results 
at the global level (such as EDU and EDU_IMM, for instance) may still generate significant differences 
in terms of labor force composition. The analysis of the active population by gender and immigrant 
status, for instance, could provide relevant insights for the study of intersectional inequalities. In that 
respect, the case of Greece is particularly informative, as including immigration differentials in the 
projection has a strong positive impact on the active population of male immigrants, while also having 
a strong negative impact on the number of active female immigrants.  
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Table 3: Value of β parameters from Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions 
 EDU= β *EDU_IMM EDU+= β *EDU_IMM+ 
Total 1.014*** 1.026*** 
   Females 1.024*** 1.046*** 
   Males 1.003*** 1.006*** 
Immigrants 1.071*** 1.072*** 
   Females 1.135*** 1.138*** 
   Males 1.014*** 1.014*** 
Test if β is different from 1.  
*** p<0.0001 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Issues related to population aging are a matter of population structure rather than population size, as 
a larger share of the elderly leads to increased public expenditures, especially in terms of health care 
and pension, and to a proportional decrease in potential workers contributing to the system (United 
Nations 2015). The labor force participation rate is therefore one of the key indicators for issues 
related to population aging (European Commission 2015).  
In this paper, we analyzed the effect of age, sex, education, generation status and duration of stay in 
the host country on labor force participation of the European Union population using regression 
analysis. The results from this regression analysis were then used as inputs to the labor force 
participation module of CEPAM-Mic, a microsimulation projection model for all EU28 member states. 
As microsimulation simulates individual life courses, labor force status in the model is stochastically 
attributed based on the actor’s characteristics and corresponding regression parameters. 
By including immigration-related differentials, CEPAM-Mic significantly improves on traditional macro 
models based on age, sex and education alone.  First, CEPAM-Mic can account for different levels of 
immigrant integration to the labor force. Indeed, patterns of economic integration vary by sex and 
between EU28 member states, as previously shown in (Kogan 2006) and confirmed in our regression 
analysis. Second, the model explicitly accounts for different effect of education for natives and 
immigrants through an interaction variable between educational attainment and immigration status 
(generation 1 born outside de EU). This takes into account the fact that degrees obtained outside the 
EU might have a lower value on the labor market. Finally, the model accounts for the impact of 
immigration on educational attainment, as education is imputed based on immigrant status, 
education of the mother, religion and language. This is important as education is a major determinant 
of labor force participation.  
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Overall, immigration is an important source of population heterogeneity when it comes to the 
projection of labor force participation. Participation rates are lower for immigrants, especially for 
recent immigrants and for immigrant women, but tend to improve with increasing duration of stay in 
the host country. The impact of immigration-related characteristics on labor force participation is 
often comparable to the impact of education, sometimes even surpassing it. The implementation of 
immigration-related variables and parameters in a microsimulation model also provides more 
flexibility in building alternative migration and integration scenarios that may prove relevant and 
useful to European policy makers.  
Analysis of projection outputs confirms that increasing international immigration level can hardly 
mitigate the expected decline of the general labor force participation rate caused by population aging 
(Bijak et al. 2008). Although the age structure of immigrants is favorable in the short term, benefits 
to the labor force are offset by their lower participation rates, especially for women. In line with the 
analysis provided by Termote (2011), our findings suggest that any policy seeking to use immigration 
as a tool to fix economic issues arising from population aging must imperatively be accompanied by 
strong and efficient measures to promote the economic integration of immigrants. When labor force 
participation rates of immigrants get too low, the effect of increasing immigration can even become 
negative.  
Our results also point to potentially rising gender inequalities in labor force participation. In most EU 
countries, the gender gap in labor force participation is larger in the immigrant population, even after 
controlling for education. This provides additional empirical evidences for what Boyd (1984) calls the 
“double disadvantage”, that of being a woman as well as an immigrant. This double disadvantage 
leads to an increase in gender imbalance for the projected labor force, even when the impact of 
immigration on the total labor force is modest. So increasing immigration levels, while obviously 
increasing the labor force size, may also widen gender inequalities, a trend that goes against the 
goals set by the European Commission in terms of gender equality (European Commission 2017). 
Further investigations are needed on this issue, especially considering that the composition of 
immigration in terms of origin varies greatly from country to country, and that the economic 
integration of immigrants also varies according to their origin (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov 2017). 
Policies related to the economic integration of immigrants should therefore put a special focus on the 
labor force participation of female immigrants.  
This paper has focused on a single aspect of the economic integration of immigrants, namely on labor 
force participation. The issues related to population aging and to the economic integration of 
immigrants, however, are numerous and are covered by a wide array of indicators. Employment rates 
and earnings, for instance, are major factors in determining the economic and fiscal impact of 
immigration, and also intersect with many other issues such as discrimination, over-qualification and 
international transferability of human capital (Aydemir & Skuterud 2005; Reyneri & Fullin 2011). 
Further developments of the CEPAM-Mic model will seek to include additional economic variables, 
such as employment status and number of hours worked per week, which would allow for a better 
assessment of the overall impact of immigration levels and composition on future labor force supply. 
Finally, we would like to underline the fact that the EU-LFS lacks a certain number of variables that 
could prove very useful in the assessment of immigrant economic integration. It is not possible in the 
EU-LFS, for instance, to distinguish natives from second-generation immigrants, a fast growing group, 
thus preventing a thorough analysis of integration across generations. Other important information on 
human capital, beyond educational attainment, are also missing, such as language proficiency and 
literacy, place of graduation and reasons for immigration. 
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